Tag Archives: economy
TradeTech 8311-250x250

TradeTech, Nov 22nd in London

I will be attending TradeTech on the 22nd in London, see below for reasons why you might want to also…

The last technical details of EMIR are due at the end of September 2012, and the impact of the interaction between EMIR, Dodd-Frank MiFID II, MiFIR and Basel III- CRD IV is gradually taking shape: By the end of this year the regulatory guidelines will be set, and from 1st Jan 2013 your implementation programme needs to be under way.

Are you prepared yet?
As the market evolves to electronic trading OTC derivatives are forced to clear, new reporting regimes are required, and the collateral constraints kick in- is your team, strategy and technology in place to cope with these changes?

Or do you need:
Greater clarity on the latest developments for EMIR, Dodd Frank, MiFID II, MiFIR, and Basel III- CRD IV and how they interact to impact your business?
Deeper insight into the evolving OTC market structure and the opportunities to exploit amidst the complexity?
Practical advice into how to adapt your trading, clearing, reporting and collateral functions to achieve compliance?
Bringing together regulators, central banks, asset managers, hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, IDB’s, execution venues, clearing members, clearing houses, and technology providers, this is the only equity derivatives conference to focus on the practical implementation of new regulations for the front, middle and back office with the industry as a whole.

For the agenda and all the details, follow this link:
http://www.wbresearch.com/tradetechderivatives/

Darrell Duffie: Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress

An interesting paper from Darrell on the ‘plumbing’ of the stability sense between the major market participants including Central Banks, CCPs, Prime Brokers and other large players. Available from his home page (
http://www.darrellduffie.com
) or download directly here.

Registration rules for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants

The SEC & CFTC finally defined what an SD or MSP is:

I went through the rules and my summary is this:

Register as Swap Dealer if:

  • Your firm routinely stands ready to enter into swaps at the request or demand of a counterparty
  • Makes a market in swaps (‘swaps’ meaning OTC / ISDA products, including options), and/or including exchange trades ‘swaps’
  • Entering into swaps to satisfy the business or risk management needs of the counterparty
  • You are maintaining a separate profit and loss statement for swap activity
  • You are allocating staff and resources to dealer-type activities
  • Your firm engages in activity causing you to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps

And for firms outside the US – the current reach of Dodd Frank means any firm transacting business with a US firm or branch of a US firm will require to register as a Swap Dealer.

Exceptions to registering as a Swap Dealer

There are a variety of exceptions to the above including:

  • The swap is hedging a loan (see the above PDF for more detail)
  • Hedging:
    • the price risks arise from the potential change in the value of assets that the person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises, liabilities that the person owns or anticipates incurring, or services that the person provides or purchases;
    • the swap represents a substitute for transactions or positions in a physical marketing channel;
    • the swap is economically appropriate to the reduction of the person’s risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise; and
    • the swap is entered into in accordance with sound commercial practices and is not structured to evade designation as a swap dealer
  • Affiliates
    • The determination of whether a person is a swap dealer excludes swaps between majority-owned affiliates. Similarly, the determination also excludes swaps between a cooperative – including agricultural cooperatives and cooperative financial institutions – and its members.
  • Notional aggregate (CFTC)
    • Dodd Frank sets an exclusion that the aggregate gross notional amount of the swaps that the person enters into over the prior 12 months in connection with dealing activities must not exceed $3 billion.
    • During the 2.5 year phase in of Swap reporting, the de minimis threshold would effectively be $8 billion
    • 9 months after the 2.5 years the results of a study by the CFTC will determine whether to increase, decrease or leave alone these thresholds
    • Either way, the $8bn expires after 5 years, and reverts to the DFA amount of $3bn
  • Notional aggregates (SEC)
    • $3bn CDS over the prior 12 months, but $8bn during the SEC ‘phase in’ period, of about 3 years

Register as a Major Swap Participant if:

  • You are a person that maintains a “substantial position” in any of the major swap categories,
    • excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk and positions maintained by certain employee benefit plans for hedging or mitigating risks in the operation of the plan
  • You are a person whose outstanding swaps create “substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States banking system or financial markets.”
  • You are a “financial entity” that is “highly leveraged relative to the amount of capital such entity holds and that is not subject to capital requirements established by an appropriate Federal banking agency” and that maintains a “substantial position” in any of the major swap categories.

The CFTC PDF (third item at the top) contains more details on what a ‘substantial position’ and ‘hedging’ mean.

BIS research paper into the margin requirements of cleared OTC products

Precis

By the end of 2012, all standardised over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives must be cleared with central counterparties (CCPs). In this paper, we estimate the amount of collateral that CCPs should demand to clear safely all interest rate swap and credit default swap positions of the major derivatives dealers.

Our estimates are based on potential losses on a set of hypothetical dealer portfolios that replicate several aspects of the way that derivatives positions are distributed within and across dealer portfolios in practice. Our results suggest that major dealers already have sufficient unencumbered assets to meet initial margin requirements, but that some of them may need to increase their cash holdings to meet variation margin calls.

We also find that default funds worth only a small fraction of dealers’ equity appear sufficient to protect CCPs against almost all possible losses that could arise from the default of one or more dealers, especially if initial margin requirements take into account the tail risks and time variation in risk of cleared portfolios.

Finally, we find that concentrating clearing of OTC derivatives in a single CCP could economise on collateral requirements without undermining the robustness of central clearing. [My emphasis - one CCP to rule them all]

Full paper at the BIS website here, (click on the right hand side to download) or download the PDF directly from this site here.

The last few pages with the graphs, plus the data on the margin models and dealer portfolios are very useful.


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